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Abstract
We explore a financial returns dimension of the exploration–exploitation dilemma. Using 1277 R&D announcements by 178
listed bio-pharmaceutical firms, we examine whether investors are myopic along the continuum of exploration (patenting and
preclinical trials) to exploitation (human clinical trials and NDA). We find that investors respond positively at every stage, but there
are differences between small and large firms. For small firms exploration is favored, provided it is focused. For large firms, there
is value in both exploration and exploitation. Projects which are part of an alliance are no more likely to generate abnormal returns.
Policy implications are discussed.
© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
A key challenge facing human therapeutics biotech-
nology firms is how to bridge the gap in both time and
resources between discovery of a compound and earn-
ings generated by sale of approved drugs. Recent data
indicate that the time taken for a drug to move through
clinical trials and the process of Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA) approval is now 8.5 years (Tufts, 2005),
with the discovery phase estimated to be a further 2–5
years (DiMasi et al., 2003). The out-of-pocket cost of
taking a drug through to FDA marketing approval is
estimated to be US$ 403 million, inclusive of the cost
of drugs that fail to make it through to the end of clin-
ical development (DiMasi et al., 2003). There are three
primary mechanisms by which this gap is bridged: pub-
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lic funding of research (Hyytinen and Toivanen, 2005);
private capital in the form of venture funding or stock
market listing; and revenue and cost sharing derived from
inter-organisational alliances with traditional pharma-
ceutical firms (Rothaermel, 2001). Between 1994 and
December 2006 it is estimated that the broad classifi-
cation of biotechnology firms operating in Europe and
North America have raised US$ 194 billions in cap-
ital and long-term debt, of which about a third was
raised from initial public offering and follow-on offer-
ings (Biocentury, 2007).
This paper focuses upon public-quoted entre-
preneurial bio-pharmaceutical firms listed on NASDAQ
and European stock exchanges. Listing provides access
to capital, in addition to an exit source for venture
financiers. The creation of NASDAQ in the US and
changes in stock market listing rules in several Euro-
pean countries in the 1990s have made it possible for
small (often loss-making) biotechnology firms to quote
directly upon a stock exchange and thus gain access to
sources of capital and innovation incentives which were
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not available earlier (Coriat and Orsi, 2002; McNamara
et al., 2000).
It has been suggested in the press and even in the aca-
demic literature that stock market investor-shareholders
over-emphasize short-term earnings at the cost of longer
term R&D (see Tylecote and Ramirez, 2006, for a
review). This bias against long-term investment in
research in, or exploration of, new technologies in favour
of exploitation of a firm’s current knowledge has been
postulated by March (1991). If such a bias exists, it
means that early stage research is disadvantaged in rais-
ing capital from the stock market. This has important
policy implications.
March’s (1991) theorizing that, due in part to more
positive short-term returns, exploitation may drive out
exploration has received mixed empirical support. Chan
et al. (2001) undertook a study of all domestic firms
quoted on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stock
exchanges from 1975 to 1995 and found that the his-
toric performance of firms who invested heavily in R&D
did not outperform those that did not, suggesting that
exploration is not necessarily associated with inferior
performance. However, Hoang and Rothaermel (2006)
found that the ultimate success of an alliance project
is lower when initiated during the exploration stage of
R&D; while, more seriously, Rothaermel (2001) found
that exploitation alliances have a positive impact upon
a pharmaceutical firm’s new product development suc-
cess, whereas exploration alliances do not. The skewed
positive financial impact of exploitation over exploration
activities is further evidenced in increased accounting
returns generated by new product launches (Bayus et
al., 2003) and also in shareholder returns (Chaney et al.,
1991; Chen et al., 2002). When combined, these studies
lend some support to the idea that financial returns from
exploitation activities aremore certain andmore positive
than those from exploration.
Whilst the exploration–exploitation dilemma is typ-
ically presented as dichotomous, it is clear that many
writers see subtle distinctions occurring along this
continuum. For example, Levinthal and March see a
different valuation between “use” and “development”
(1993: 105). Following the argument that exploitation
drives out exploration due to clearer, more temporally
proximate and larger financial feedback, the same may
apply for development and use. Use activities are less
uncertain in outcome than development activities and so
may generate higher returns.
The theoretic perspectives of Levinthal and March
(1993) are often cited in the literature; however most
studies only explore the basic dichotomy between explo-
ration and exploitation. Few studies explore the financial
impact of themicro stages that occurwithin each of these
activities. Unpicking the micro stages may well shed
light onwhy previous studies have been ambiguous. This
paper uses the public nature of the bio-pharmaceutical
industry’s R&Dprocess to explore the financial response
of shareholders to announcements of positive news along
six micro stages of the exploration–exploitation contin-
uum. We classify the first two of these micro stages,
namely patenting and preclinical trials, as exploration
activities.We classify the remaining four micro stages as
exploitation activities, namely the three phases of human
clinical trials (phase 1, 2 and 3 trials) and the New Drug
Application (NDA) regulatory approval process. In this
industry there is a clear validation process supported by
regulated bodies for each of these six micro stages of the
exploration–exploitation process.
We go further than testing for a general bias against
exploration; we also look for a bias against smaller firms
undertaking such work. Some argue that small firms are
not suited to undertake risky R&D requiring substantial
knowledge and financial resources. The lack of scale and
scope in smaller firmsmay cause them to be less efficient
than larger firms in the drug R&D process (DiMasi et al.,
1995). However, small firms may have a comparative
advantage in early stage R&D because they are nimble
and flexible (Powell, 1998).
The paper begins by exploring these arguments in
some detail from a theory perspective. We then exam-
ine empirically how investor-shareholders value R&D
investments in bio-pharmaceutical firms’ R&D process.
Our data set contains information on 1227 announce-
ments of the initiation and progress of stages of R&D
projects by178 entrepreneurial bio-pharmaceutical firms
listed on US and European stock markets between 1996
and 2003. It provides encouraging evidence that the typi-
cal investor in stockmarkets is not somyopic as to ignore
the value potential of exploration and that they see the
value of smaller firms undertaking early stage work. We
consider the implications of our findings for the strate-
gies of small and large firms. We also comment on the
value of institutional policies that can be introduced to
assist firms in their access to capital from stock markets.
2. Theory and hypothesis development
2.1. Exploration–exploitation theory
It was March (1991) who explicitly discussed
and classified managerial search behavior on an
exploration–exploitation continuum. In his modeling,
he makes the claim that managers will be biased against
exploratory search because “[t]he certainty, speed,
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proximity, and clarity of feedback ties exploitation to its
consequencesmore quickly and precisely than is the case
with exploration. The story is told in many forms. Basic
research has less certain outcomes, longer time horizons
and more diffuse effects than further development of
existing ones.” (March, 1991: 73). A tension between
exploration and exploitation exists because “exploita-
tion generates clearer, earlier and closer feedback than
exploration. It corrects itself sooner and yields more
positive returns in the near term. As a result, the primary
challenge to sustaining an optimal mix of exploration
and exploitation is the tendency of rapid learners and
successful firms to reduce the resources allocated to
exploration.” (Levinthal and March, 1993: 107).
From early on in the debate, writers have seen
subtle distinctions occurring along the exploration–
exploitation continuum. For example, Levinthal and
March suggest that exploitation has two distinct phases,
namely “use and development of things already known”
(1993: 105). “Development” is the expansion of the
firm’s current stock of knowledge, whereas “use” is the
appropriation of economic returns of the current stock
of knowledge. Following the argument that exploitation
drives out exploration due to clearer, more temporally
proximate, andgreater financial feedback, the sameargu-
ment may apply for development and use. Use activities
are more certain in outcome than development activities,
being closer to the market in terms of gaining a finan-
cial reward. This means that within exploitation phases,
returns may become larger as the firm progresses from
the beginning of the exploitation-development phase to
its use phase.
2.2. Prior studies
The theoretic perspectives of Levinthal and March
(1993) are often cited in the literature; however
most studies only explore this concept as a bi-modal
dichotomy between exploration and exploitation. Few
if any studies explore the financial impact of the micro
stages that occurwithin each of these activities. The basic
work on the tension between exploration and exploita-
tion appears in a variety of contexts, such as the role of
alliances in new product development (Holmqvist, 2004;
Rothaermel andDeeds, 2004), managerial processes and
new business project effectiveness (McGrath, 2001), the
growth of the firm (Lee et al., 2003), knowledge flows
in multi-divisional firms (Schulz, 2001), performance in
rugged competitive landscapes (Gavetti and Levinthal,
2000) and organizational renewal (Daneels, 2002). The
evidence is generally in favor of all activities being
important, but of exploitation being more valued.
The nature of the evidence that is used varies. Some
writers use the structure of accounting returns to support
the claim that exploitation is more financially reward-
ing (Bayus et al., 2003; Rothaermel, 2001). However,
there are difficulties in using accounting returns. Broadly
speaking accounting standards in the US and Europe
require that R&D costs be expensed in the profit and loss
account when they are incurred, rather than amortized
over a longer period as a balance sheet asset (Khadaroo
and Shaikh, 2003). This means that short-term account-
ing earnings will be depressed when there is investment
in long-term R&D.
Using event study methods which look at investor
reactions to announcements avoids this problem. Event
studies isolate the value that is created by the incre-
mental investment in R&D well before the revenues
are generated. Some event studies indicate that the
announcement of positive news about exploitation events
generate greater positive abnormal returns for sharehold-
ers than exploration events (Kelmet al., 1995;Narayanan
et al., 2000).
Like many other researchers we use event study
methodologies to explore our data. The matter is not
just one of empirical choice; there are theory issues at
stake too. Event studies factor out general market effects
to focus on firm effects (for more details see MacKinlay,
1997). Event studies rely heavily on signalling theory to
drawa connection betweenfirmactivities andfirmvalua-
tions. Signalling theory argues that investor-shareholders
react to management communications about the on-
going activities of the firm (Alchian and Demetz, 1972;
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Littler, 2006). These sig-
nals relate to the start and end points of major strategic
activities, such as R&D, and to on-going information
about incremental progress such as product testing.
Few announcements come as a complete surprise to
shareholders: most contain information that results in
an adjustment of shareholders’ expectations about the
future performance of the firm (Narayanan et al., 2000).
When management chooses to make a disclosure, say
of its intention to undertake preclinical trials or the out-
come of a previously announced preclinical trial project,
shareholders use this information to incrementally adjust
their expectations of the future earnings of the firm. This
is ultimately reflected in their decision to hold, sell, or
buy the stock of the bio-pharmaceutical firm.
2.3. Pattern and shape of exploration–exploitation
returns in bio-pharmaceuticals
Our approach is to unpick in a fine grained
manner the new product development process in bio-
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pharmaceuticals as a way to break down and explore
stock market responses to the exploration–exploitation
continuum. We use incremental announcements of
progress in the R&D process to provide a more fine-
grained analysis than that offered by previous studies.
To create this fine-grained approach, we focus upon six
important micro stages within this industry’s R&D pro-
cess. The first micro stage is the award of a patent. The
second micro stage is preclinical trials when the medici-
nal potential of the compound is assessed. The next three
micro stages are discussed together and cover when the
compound is being developed through the three phases
of human clinical trials (phases 1, 2, and 3). The final
micro stage is submission and acceptance of the NDA
to regulators who grant marketing approval for the drug
to be sold legally. Government bodies carefully regulate
each of these stages. These six micro stages are largely
linear with activity in one stage building on outcomes
from all prior stages. Prior literature has characterized
the early stages of this process (namely, patenting and
preclinical trials) as akin to exploration and the final
stages (namely, human clinical trials andNDA) as akin to
exploitation (DiMasi, 1995; DiMasi et al., 2003; Flieger,
1995; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004: 209–210). Prior lit-
erature has strongly argued that each stage represents
definable progress for the R&D process.
We expect that positive news from all sixmicro stages
will generate positive abnormal returns, in part because
of the strong appropriation and regulatory regimes in
which such invention takes place. This gives sharehold-
ers confidence that in the event of technical success a
share of future accounting returns can be secured due to
patent ownership (Coriat and Orsi, 2002). The reliability
of the information announced on progress in both pre-
clinical and clinical trials can be assessed in a structured
manner within the context of stock exchange rules on
forward looking statements, the technical rules of drug
regulatory authorities and the professional practices and
norms of the natural sciences.
Hypothesis 1. Announcements of new positive news
regarding commencement or progress in any of the six
stages of the bio-pharmaceutical R&D process will gen-
erate positive abnormal returns.
We now say a little more about the drug R&D process
and its probabilities of success for the benefit of those
who do not know the industry. The first key stage is the
process of drug discovery to identify a promising drug
candidate from the laboratory, including the patenting of
this compound. The probabilities of success at this stage
are low. However, the issuance of a patent is important
because it enables the firm to have the option of negotiat-
ingR&Dandcommercializationdealswith collaborative
partners in amore secure long-termappropriation regime
(Cohen et al., 2002), and it also signals to the financial
community the novelty and promise of their exploration
activities (Niosi, 2003). The probability of a compound
entering drug discovery making it through this stage to
eventual market approval is estimated to be as low as 1
in 10,000 or 0.01% (Pharmaceutical Research and Man-
ufacturers of America, PhRMA, 2007). The second key
stage is preclinical trials, where the potential for the drug
compound to improve human health is explored in both
laboratory and animal studies. Preclinical trials represent
a considerable change in terms of both context and prob-
ability of market launch. The end of preclinical trials is
triggered by success in obtaining an Investigational New
Drug (IND) license from the regulator and progression
on to human clinical trials. Thus the research context
moves from the laboratory and animal testing into the
more externally regulated world of testing the efficacy
of the drug via human clinical trials. The probability
of successful market launch at the commencement of
preclinical trials rises considerably from the 0.01% at
the start of drug discovery and patenting to somewhere
between 2 and 7% (PhRMA, 2007; Jagle, 1999). Pre-
clinical trials not only mark the end of the exploration
process, but also the end of conceptual and non-human
trials; for this reason we expect that exploration returns
will peak at this point.
After preclinical trials the firm makes a decision
whether to try andmove between the processes of explo-
ration to exploitation. If the firm decides to enter the
process of exploitation then it has to obtain an IND
license to commence phase 1 human clinical trials. The
decision to enter phase 1 trials is critical and the prob-
ability of market launch rises to 21.5% (DiMasi et al.,
2003). Thus positive news that a firm will enter human
clinical trials is indicative of considerable improvement
in the likelihood of the drug making it to the market
place. Clinical trials are subject to considerable external
regulatory oversight. At this stage the key risk is that the
drug will fail to attain the technical clinical end points in
each of the three human clinical trials (phases 1, 2 and 3).
The probability of success is not uniformly distributed
across these three phases of human clinical trials. Empir-
ical analysis by DiMasi (2002) observes that almost half
of all decisions to abandon human clinical trials occur
during phase 2, with 12.6% of all abandonment occur-
ring at phase 3. The end of the exploitation process in
this study is not, however, human clinical trials, but rather
approval of an NDA clearing the way for legal market-
ing of the drug. Thus the fourth key stage of this R&D
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process is the submission and outcome of an NDA to the
regulatory authorities. Of course, there is a risk that the
regulator will reject an application to grant marketing
approval due to technical deficiencies in the application
as a whole; however this risk is low and evidence from
DiMasi (2001) indicates that the probability of success
once a firm submits an NDA is about 90%.
Taking on board the ideas of March (1991) and
Levinthal and March (1993) about the distinctive nature
of exploration and exploitation processes we therefore
hypothesize that the returns on each of the stages will
differ. In particular we suggest that returns will peak at
the end of exploration, namely preclinical trials, where
the probability of market launch is about 2–7%. We also
suggest that the returns to exploitation will peak at the
end of this process, namely NDA, where the probability
of market launch rises to 90%.
Hypothesis 2a. The returns to exploration investments
will peak at the end of the process, namely preclinical
trials.
Hypothesis 2b. The returns to exploitation investments
will peak at the end of the process, namely NDA.
2.4. Firm size effects
DiMasi et al. (1995) are among many that suggest
that small firms are less efficient at research than large
firms. This may be occasioned by a combination of
their lack of experience, their lack of resources, their
inability to manage risk effectively and the lack of a
proven track record for investors. For this reason one
might expect the investor community to value small
firm research intentions and outcomes less highly than
that of larger firms. However, it has been argued that
small firms are more flexible and less subject to hier-
archical inefficiencies of larger enterprises, especially
when engaged in smaller projects. Small biotechnology
firms have played an important role in the development
of bio-pharmaceuticals by acting as a bridge between
exploration research by universities and exploitation by
larger pharmaceutical firms with human clinical trial
and marketing capabilities (Roijakkers and Hagedoorn,
2006). Early stage work in biotechnology is less cap-
ital intensive and relies on less complex, scale driven,
organizational capabilities than the exploitation stage of
the drug R&D process. Thus we posit that smaller firms
will have a comparative advantage in exploration activi-
ties. We therefore explore with our data whether there is
a small-firm effect in the market reaction to announce-
ments.
The market may react to both announcements by
small firms about the outcomes of their R&D activities
and also about their intentions to enter into the next stage
of the R&D process. When a small firm signals that it is
committing to enter into the next micro stage of an R&D
project, it is placing additional resource and capability
strains upon the firm. Shareholders may be uncertain
about the small firm’s organizational capability to deliver
upon its promises. Investor assessments of the value of
intentions to enter into the next stage of the R&Dprocess
rely upon the competencies of management. How reli-
able are the assessments of the management of a small
firm about their organizational capabilities to manage
additional resource strains and make realistic assess-
ments about the probabilities of their success? It may
be that a shareholder in a small firm values information
on the outcomes of R&D projects more than statements
of intentions. This could be because outcomes commu-
nicate the ability of the firm to deliver upon its past R&D
promises
In contrast, a larger firm is likely to be more expe-
rienced and have more resources and capabilities at its
disposal. The market capitalization of a firm is a reflec-
tion of investors’ expectations about the future financial
earnings of the firm. Future earnings estimates rely on
the firm’s ability to convince investors of the value of its
current competencies and its investment intentions.Their
size, in terms of market capitalization, is a proxy for the
strength of their resources and capabilities. It is also a
proxy for the firm’s ability to deliver on prior investment
intentions. These firms have a track record of communi-
cation with shareholders on their investment intentions
and the probability of converting intentions into pos-
itive outcomes. Shareholders of larger firms have the
duel concern of getting product to the marketplace and
replenishment of the R&D pipeline with new exploita-
tion opportunities. Thus we expect that shareholders of
large firms will be equally interested in news about
the intentions of a large firm to enter the next stage
of the R&D process and news of outcomes of such
a stage.
Hypothesis 3a. Announcements by small firms that
they are starting the next stage of the drug R&D process
will be received less positively than the outcome of such
a stage.
Hypothesis 3b. Announcement by large firms that they
are starting the next stage of the drug R&D process
will be as positively valued as an announcement of the
outcome of such a stage.
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2.5. Partnership effects
Frequently the R&D activities of biotechnology firms
are undertaken with strategic alliance partners. There is
a considerable body of evidence in the literature to indi-
cate that the announcement of the formation of a strategic
alliance can result in positive abnormal returns (Das
et al., 1998; McConnell and Nantell, 1985; Merchant
and Schendel, 2000; Xu, 2006). An interesting ques-
tion here is whether shareholder investors anticipate
all of the value creation effect of an R&D alliance at
the alliance formation announcement. Alternatively, the
activities of alliance partners may evolve over time in
an unanticipated manner creating, or destroying, value
in an R&D project. If the second scenario were the
case then we would expect R&D activities conducted in
alliance settings to generate different shareholder returns
to in-house R&D projects at each of the six stages of
progress.
The fact that alliances bring value is not in dispute.
Danzon et al. (2005) argue that the presence of a large
alliance partner in the conduct of human clinical trials
raises the probability of success. They demonstrate that
the success of phase 2 clinical trials rises by between
13 and 17% when the project is conducted in an alliance
with a large partner compared to firms that undertake the
phase 2 trial on their own. The success of phase 3 clinical
trials rises by between 11 and 15% when a large partner
is involved in the alliance. DiMasi (2002) reinforces this
point, noting that an overall increase of 4.1% in the prob-
ability of success in human clinical trials would result in
a US$ 100 million saving in capitalized costs.
However, Alvarez and Barney (2001) argue that at the
outset ofmany alliances small firms experience increases
in share price even though over the life of the alliance
large firms appropriate most of the value of the alliance:
indeed 80% of small firms in their study felt that they
were unfairly exploited by large partners, resulting in
loss of value. The work of Robinson and Stuart (2007a)
demonstrates that smaller firms who are less centrally
embedded in a wider industry alliance network give up a
greater amount of equity to alliancepartners. Smaller less
centrally embedded partners also receive smaller upfront
payments (Robinson and Stuart, 2007b). Combined, this
evidence leads us to believe that after alliance forma-
tion large partners continue to appropriate increasing
amounts of the value created by the alliance.
Hypothesis 4. Announcements of R&D activities
undertaken as part of an alliance partnership will be neu-
tral or negative for small firms and positive for large
firms.
3. Methods
Using the event study method, our dependent vari-
able is the abnormal returns generated on the day of an
announcement. Event studies assess the reaction of the
financial markets to announcements of new information
by a firm in terms of a rise or fall in share price over and
above the normal expected behavior of that share.Under-
pinning the event studymethodology is the semi-efficient
market hypothesis, which argues that all publicly avail-
able information that offers insight into the present and
future performance of a share is promptly digested by
the market (Fama, 1991). Returns in excess of market
performance should not persist beyond the short term
required to assimilate the new information (typically a
day).
Event studies have been employed in the litera-
ture to assess the impact both of regular required
announcements (such as financial earnings statements),
unexpected events, such as the senior executive death
(Worrell et al., 1986) and disclosure of on-going projects,
such as R&D (Narayanan et al., 2000), new product
launches (Chaney et al., 1991), and FDA decisions on
NDAs (Torabzadeh et al., 1998). Thus the method has a
well established track record for assessing shareholder
responses to incremental announcements of on-going
corporate activities. Some prior event studies have,
however, suffered from methodological defects that
limited their validity. Thus we have been careful to
apply the event study method as outlined by MacKinlay
(1997), managing the problems of confounding events
(McWilliams andSiegel, 1997), avoiding the use of a sin-
gle expected-returns models (Chatterjee et al., 1998) and
rising to the challenges of event studies in multi-country
settings (Park, 2004).
3.1. Sample
WeemployedBiocentury, an online industry database
that reports and classifies press releases by bio-
pharmaceutical firms as our database and sampling
frame. Our initial sample was the complete set of firms
active in human therapeutics between 1996 and 2003 that
were listed on the NASDAQ, London, Paris, Frankfurt
and Milan stock exchanges. These 220 firms gener-
ated 2986 announcements about progress in the six
stages of the R&D process (patenting, preclinical trials,
phase 1, phase 2 and phase 3 human clinical trials, and
NDA). Following good practice, all confounding events
that occurred in a window of three days prior to the
date of the R&D announcement through to three days
after the announcement were identified and eliminated
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(McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). Examples of confound-
ing events included announcement of financial results,
alliance formation, changes in management and other
R&D events. This reduced the number of firms to 178
and announcements to 1277.
3.2. Measures
3.2.1. Independent variables—six stages of the
R&D process
We explained earlier how we defined each of the six
stages of the R&D process for drug development. Here
we remind the reader that we labeled the granting of
both patents and preclinical trials as exploration activi-
ties. We also labeled the three stages of human clinical
trials (phases 1, 2, and 3) and NDA as exploitation activ-
ities. Our classification of patenting and preclinical trials
as exploration and human trials (phases 1, 2 and 3) and
NDA activities as exploitation are in line with prior bio-
pharmaceutical studies (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004:
209–210).
To ensure accuracy of coding of each event, the orig-
inal source of the announcement was obtained through
a combined search of Biocentury, the company website
archived press releases and the Lexis-Nexus databases
of news sources. The article or press release was read
in full by a trained coder and the event was then
classified into one of the six stages. Coding was cross-
checked by the first author. Disagreements over coding
were resolved through meetings of coders, where the
source material was discussed. We also checked the
dataset for the presence of repeat announcements, where
the same information is re-announced in another pub-
lication or multiple times in the same publication.
As repeat announcements do not provide new infor-
mation to the market, they were excluded from the
study.
3.2.2. Start of next stage of the R&D process
We were interested in whether the announcement of
intention to start the next stage of the R&D process
triggered abnormal returns. To test for Hypotheses 3a
and 3b we coded each event as to whether or not it
was an announcement regarding the initiation, or start,
of one of the six micro stages of the R&D process
(start = 1).
3.2.3. Firm size and age
We divided our firms into size classes. In our first
stage of analysis we divided our data set into two and
used the median capitalization of our whole sample as
the cut-off point. We undertook tests to check if small
changes in classification altered the results, andwe found
that our results were robust.1
In our second and finer-grained analysis of possible
size effects, we use R&D expenditure as a proxy for firm
size. This is a more exact measure that is only available
for a sub-sample of firm observations. When exploring
our size hypothesis using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
models we split the sample around median R&D expen-
diture as a way of further controlling for size effects.
In line with many other previous studies we look to
see if the age of a firm has an effect. We measure age as
the number of years since firm foundation. This control is
in keepingwith other biotechnology studies (Rothaermel
and Deeds, 2006; Sorensen and Stuart, 2000).
3.2.4. Alliances
Our data on alliances were gathered from Biocen-
tury and checked with other sources. We were interested
in whether firms that had alliances associated with
their announcements would perform differently to those
that did not. To test for Hypothesis 4 we coded each
announcement as to whether or not the project was being
undertaken with an alliance partner (alliance yes = 1).
3.2.5. Other control variables
We used cash balances as a control variable. The cash
balance of a biotechnology firm is an important proxy
for managerial discretion. Where cash balance is high
management do not need to call upon capital markets
for additional capital in the near term. A firm with rela-
tively lowcashbalancewill need to either curtail research
expenditures or prepare for an additional call for funds
to the capital market. In this case firms are likely to have
lower managerial discretion.
Because the pull of cash can be offset by revenues,
we used revenues as another control variable. Cash can
be generated from milestone payments from alliance
1 We also divided our sample into quartiles according to their market
capitalization. Comparison of mean abnormal returns divided into size
quartiles did not reveal that significant differences between quartiles,
thus for the remainder of the paper we stratify the full sample around
median market capitalization. It has been demonstrated in the Finance
literature that average returns can vary according to the market value
of a firm (Fama and French, 1992). This occurs for several reasons.
The first is a measurement issue. Imagine that an event added US$ 50
million to the value of a firm. For a firm valued at US$ 100 million
this would be a return of 50%, whereas for a firm valued at US$ 1000
million it would be 5%. The second reason may be to do with signaling
effects by the capital markets. Shareholders of large firms may be
concerned with different issues from those of small firms. We take the
view that the second effect is potentially important and explore this in
our Hypothesis 3.
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partners, contract work or in some cases product sales.
Greater revenues may thus increase managerial dis-
cretion; therefore we control for a firm’s revenues as
recorded in the earnings report preceding the announce-
ment.
We control for the timing of announcements over
the industry lifecycle because it may influence returns.
In 1996, the start of the period of study, the bio-
pharmaceutical industry was still relatively young,
whilst by 2003 the industry had matured considerably
with hundreds of firms listed on stock exchanges. It is
possible that, as more firms were listed on exchanges
and thus more R&D announcements were released,
the abnormal returns generated by such announcements
changed as investor experience matured. Thus we have
controlled for this effect by testing returns annually for
differences across time, both for the sample as a whole
and for each of the size classes of firm.
Finally, this study contains firms listed onbothUSand
EU stock exchanges. To control for the possible impact
of institutional differences we also controlled for this
(EU= 1).
3.3. Dependent variable: abnormal returns
We calculated abnormal returns using the standard
event study method as detailed by MacKinlay (1997).
Following standard practice, expected or normal returns
for company i are calculated as being a function of the
returns obtained by the market where:
Eit = αi + βRmt + ξit
Rmt is the continuously compounded realized returns on
day t for a market index m. α is the regression constant
derived from regressing Rit against Rmt. βi is the regres-
sion coefficient derived from regressing Rit against Rmt.
ξit is the error term derived from the regression with a
mean of zero and a constant variance.
We applied a standard 160 estimation period starting
at t− 180 days prior to the event day t= 0 and ending
on day t− 20. Park (2004) warns that major terrorism
events can temporary distort market returns and this is
problematic where estimation data cross these events. To
manage this issue, we have excluded all NASDAQ listed
company events during the period 11 September 2001 to
the end of 2001.
Abnormal returns are then calculated as:
ARit = Ri − Eit
Rit is the actual return on the day of announcement of
an event. The selection of market index influences what
the model will assign as the normal price behavior of
a given share. Most studies choose a single index and
do not test the sensitivity of the abnormal return effect
to selection of market index. Aware of criticisms of the
event study method (Chatterjee et al., 1998), this study
calculated expected returns using four models. Twomar-
ket models regressed company returns against the local
market composite index and a second model used local
biotechnology industry index returns. Following their
recommendation, we used both market models, as noted
above, and the simpler average market index adjusted
returns model as well as the average returns of the com-
pany itself. We report on the similarities between the
different measures in our results section.
3.4. Calculating the day of announcement
In multi-country event studies, accurate identifica-
tion of the day upon which an announcement first
became available to the local stock market can be prob-
lematic (Park, 2004). In identifying day zero we have
searched the company website press release archives
and over 12,000 worldwide news sources contained in
Lexis-Nexus to determine the time at which information
contained in an announcement first became available to
the market. We were also careful to consider the impact
of local public holidays duringwhichmarkets are closed.
Similar care was used in determining day zero of con-
founding events. Thus we are confident that we have
accurately identified day zero of our 1277 events and
that confounding events have not occurred within a −3
to +3 day window of these events. To further reinforce
our confidence in accurate identification of day zero all
eventswere cross-checked by an independent researcher.
3.5. OLS model
It is common in the management stream of the event
study literature to regress abnormal returns against a
series of control variables in addition to the indepen-
dent variables (in this case stage of R&D process using
OLS multiple regression models). Examples of such an
approach include Kale et al. (2002) and Narayanan et al.
(2000). Price and market capitalization data were avail-
able for all events; however accounting and other control
data were available only for a sub-set of the sample. For
these firms we used abnormal returns on the day of the
announcement as the dependent variable.
To reduce the potential for multicollinearity due to
scale outliners, all continuous variables were converted
into their log. The models reported in Table 5 do not
exhibit multicollinearity issues. The VIFs in all cases
were well below the suggested maximum of 10 (Myers,
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1990; Bowerman and O’Connell, 1990). Furthermore
the tolerances were all well above 0.2, which suggests
the absence of a multicollinearity issue (Menard, 1995).
The focus of this OLS analysis is to explore the signif-
icance of the coefficients of the independent variables
(coded dummy variables with a value of 1 if present and
0 if not for all of the following: key stages of R&D pro-
cess: patent, preclinical trials, phases 1, 2, 3 and NDA;
start of stage; and alliances) and controls (log of R&D
expenditure, cash, revenue, and firm age; stock exchange
dummyEU=1).We are not concerned with theR2 of the
models, which fall within the range of similar event stud-
ies in the management literature (Chen et al., 2002; Das
et al., 1998; Kale et al., 2002; Narayanan et al., 2000).
4. Results
4.1. Checks for the robustness of the data and the
overall response to announcements
We carefully explored the robustness of the data set
and tested the extent to which the market responds
to an announcement of incremental progress in the
exploration–exploitation process on the day of that
announcement as opposed to some other nearby date.
Abnormal returns of +3.30% (t= 16.263, p< .001) are
generated on the day of the announcement. In sharp
contrast, returns on days −5 to +5 are not significantly
different from zero, with the exception of day minus
2 where there is a small negative return of −0.25%
(p< .05). It is clear that the event effect is primarily cap-
tured on day zero and therefore for the remainder of the
paper we will report abnormal returns for day zero only.
We tested to see if returns differed significantly
depending on which of the four expected returns mod-
els (two of which were based on market indices and
two of which were constant mean return models) were
used to calculate abnormal returns. We found that these
returns were not significantly different from each other
(f= .0577). In choosing which returns to report in this
paper we decided, following convention, to use the local
index composite market model (in common with over
30 event studies published in the management field). We
also note that the returns generated by this model were
the lowest of the four models, with the highest returns
of 3.80% being generated by the average adjusted local
market index returns model.
Wewere also concernedwith controlling for the effect
of the industry life-cycle. The popular press suggests
that, after 2001, the market reacted to announcements
differently and more severely. A simple Fisher F test
revealed that returns did not differ significantly across
each of the years from 1996 to 2003 (f= 1.377). Thus we
do not need to stratify the sample by year.
We also tested for size effects, codingfirms as small, if
their market capitalization was less than the median, and
large if greater than the median in any given year. From
Table 1 we can see that small firms generate significantly
larger abnormal returns than large firms (4.01% versus
2.91%, t= 2.94). This difference in returns between small
and large firms is significant at p< .001. (We also coded
firms into quartiles in terms of market capitalization,
but this did not reveal any further differences.) We will
discuss small firm effects in more detail later.
4.2. Exploration–exploitation continuum
Tables 1 and 2 report the abnormal returns gener-
ated by exploration and exploitation announcements.
Table 1 reports results grouped between the dyad of
exploration–exploitation and Table 2 reports the results
for each of the six types of announcement separately.
According to both Tables 1 and 2, positive announce-
ments on progress along the exploration–exploitation
continuum generate positive returns for both large and
small firms for each and every stage. There is strong evi-
dence that positive news about all six stages of the R&D
process is highly valued in the stock market, supporting
Hypothesis 1.
To test forHypothesis 2we need to look at the trend of
returns over all the six phases. We undertook a pair-wise
analysis of differences between these six stages and these
are reported in Table 2. When considering the results of
Table 1
Comparison of percentage abnormal returns (day zero): firm size and the exploration–exploitation dyad (N= 1277; large = 811; small = 466 firms;
explore = 314; exploit = 958)
All firms % abnormal return Small firm events % abnormal return Large firm events % abnormal return
All events 3.30*** (0.201) 4.01*** (0.376) 2.91*** (0.232)
Exploration events 3.98*** (0.436) 5.14*** (0.727) 3.00*** (0.510)
Exploitation events 3.08*** (0.226) 3.47*** (0.433) 2.88*** (0.260)
Differences Explore > exploit* Explore > exploit* N.S. differences
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance of t-test *p< .05; **p< .01; ***p< .001. N.S. = not significant.
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Fig. 1. (a) Trend analysis: exploration exploitation six stage cycle. Percentage abnormal returns. N= 1277; large = 811; small = 466. (b) Trend
analysis: exploration exploitation six stage cycle. US$ millions abnormal returns. N= 1277; large = 811; small = 466. Note: Polynomial contrasts,
trend analysis confirms that for small firms the most significant trend is cubic trend (F= 8.081, p< .01), whilst for large firms the most significant
trend is quadratic (F= 9.368, p< .01). In each case the peaks are at the end of exploration (preclinical trials) and exploitation (NDA).
the full sample, without consideration of size effects, the
returns appear to peak at the end of both exploration (pre-
clinical trials) and the end point of exploitation (NDA).
This lends support for Hypotheses 2a and 2b.
4.3. Aggregate trend analysis
Stratification of the sample by company size into
large and small firms usingmarket capitalizationmedian
reinforces the view that returns vary over the R&D
process, but introduces a much richer picture. First, as
shown in Table 1, small firms achieve a higher return
for exploration announcements than for exploitation
announcements. (The reader should note that the very
small sample of small firms achieving NDA means that
the weight of this activity is small in our overall sample.)
This result is the exact opposite of that posited byMarch
(1991) and those that claim the exploration–exploitation
dilemma is important. The same result cannot be said for
large firms. Here it seems that there is no significant dif-
ference between exploration and exploitation activities.
We discuss the significance of both these results later.
When we look at the shape of the returns over the
individual stages of the R&D process, the split sam-
ple gives again a very rich picture. For small firms,
preclinical trial announcements generate greater posi-
tive abnormal returns (6.21%) compared to those for
phase 1 clinical trials (3.04%). These returns are sta-
tistically different from each other (p< .10). For large
firms NDA announcements generate abnormal returns
of 5.71%, which is greater than the returns associated
with announcements by large firms of earlier stages of
exploitation (phase 1 abnormal returns are 1.93% and
phase 2 abnormal returns are 1.66%). For large firms
the abnormal returns generated by NDA announcements
are statistically different from earlier stage exploitation
events, namely phases 1 and 2 clinical trials (p< .001).
However, the abnormal returns generated by large firms
announcing preclinical trials are not significantly differ-
ent from other announcements including NDA. Thus it
appears there is some support forHypothesis 2a for small
firms and Hypothesis 2b for large firms.
Although pair-wise analysis is powerful, we probed
the data further in two ways. First we undertook a trend
analysis across the stages, and then we undertook a sta-
tistical analysis on a sub-sample of observations. There
are clearly complex trends going on across the stages
of product development. Fig. 1a illustrates the trend in
percentage abnormal returns across the six stages of the
exploration–exploitation cycle for the small and large
firms reported separately. Traditionally the event study
method only reports the percentage abnormal returns, as
it is argued the key issue for a shareholder is percent-
age return, not the dollar change in firm value. It may
be of interest for readers to visualize the dollar impact
of these six micro stages of the R&D process. In Fig. 1b
we convert percentage abnormal returns into US$ mil-
lions (by multiplying the abnormal return on day 0 by
the firm market valuation on the same day).2 We can see
the size effect in Fig. 1a and b. The percentage returns
generated by small firms is greater than large firms in
Fig. 1a, whilst in Fig. 1b that the raw dollar amount for
small firms is lesser than for large firms.
The trends in Fig. 1a indicate that there are two peaks
in terms of abnormal returns, namely preclinical trials
and NDA, both of which are surrounded by troughs.
We analyzed the trends of these six stages of the R&D
2 We thank an anonymous reviewer for making this suggestion.
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix (sub-sample, n= 417 events with full control data)
Variables Mean S.D. Abnormal
return (%)
Research and development
(US$ millions)
Cash
(US$ millions)
Revenue
(US$ millions)
Abnormal return (%) 3.28 0.65
Research and development (US$ millions) 10.18 10.96 −.080
Cash (US$ millions) 125.66 213.39 −.064 .761
Revenue (US$ millions) 6.84 18.48 −.017 .497 .402
Firm age 11.23 4.91 .004 .125 .113 .237
N= 417. Quarterly earnings report accounting data.
process to see if they were linear, U shaped quadratic or
cubic (two turning points). In no case did we find a linear
trend producing a good fit. Rather we found that themost
significant trends were cubic for the sample as a whole
(f= 9.949, p< .01) and also for small firms (f= 5.430,
p< .01) and quadratic for large firms (f= 8.816, p< .01).
Each of these polynomials indicates that there are peaks
at the end micro stages of exploration and exploitation.
Fig. 1a visually demonstrates these trends, with all three
trends showing the peaks to be the end of exploration
(preclinical trials) and the end of exploitation (NDA).
In conclusion, we can say that Hypothesis 2a predicts
a local peak in exploration for preclinical trials. This
Hypothesis 2a appears valid for large and small firms
alike. A similar statement seems true for Hypothesis 2b
about a local peak in exploitation for NDA; however,
for small firms we have to be careful about the strength
of this statement due to the small number of NDA
observations.
4.4. Finer grained statistical analysis of a
sub-sample of the data
We undertook multiple-regression on a sub-sample
of 417 events for which full control data were available
to obtain additional insights into Hypothesis 2. For this
sub-sample,we control for firm size usingR&Dexpendi-
tures. Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the 417
announcements. Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics,
split by firm size. Although small firms havemuch lower
R&D expenditure, cash balances and revenues than large
firms; both small and large firms have a similar mean age
of about 11 years.
Table 5 reports the results of our OLS regressions:
models 1–4 are for small firms and models 5–8 are for
largefirms.Models 1 and5 report the controls only.Mod-
els 2 and 6 add in the dummy variables for stage of R&D
(to avoid collinear effects the dummy for phase 1 trials
is dropped), enabling further inspection of Hypotheses
2a and 2b. Models 3 and 7 include a dummy variable for
whether the announcement is regarding the initiation or
start of one of the six micro stages of the R&D process
(start = 1). This enables testing of Hypotheses 3a and 3b.
Finally models 4 and 8 add the dummy for whether or
not an R&D project announcement involves an alliance
partner or not. This enables testing of Hypothesis 4.
Model 2 indicates that the returns for each stage of
the R&D process for small firms are not significant. We
believe this may be the consequence of small sample
size: for our full sample the results are quite clear. For
large firms, model 6 indicates that the end of exploration,
namelypreclinical trials, is positive (p< .01) and also that
the coefficient for the end stage of exploration, namely
NDA, is also positive (p< .01). From Table 5 we can see
that this result continues to hold in models 6, 7 and 8,
which all show positive coefficients for the preclinical
(p< .05) and NDA stages of the R&D process (p< .01).
Taking the evidence from Fig. 1a (trends of each stage)
Table 4
Descriptive statistics for small and large firm (sub-sample, n= 417)
Variables Small firms: 180 events Large firms: 237 events
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Abnormal return (%) 4.03 0.72 2.52 0.60
Research and development (US$ millions) 3.11 1.85 15.55 11.93
Cash (US$ millions) 33.72 42.25 195.50 259.94
Revenue (US$ millions) 2.33 7.68 10.28 23.028
Firm age 11.56 6.06 11.00 3.830
Small = less than median R&D. Quarterly earnings report accounting data.
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and models 6, 7 and 8 from Table 5 we find further sup-
port for Hypotheses 2a and 2b for large firms which was
discussed earlier.
4.5. Announcements of intentions versus
announcements of outcomes
Many firms not only signal the results of an R&D
stage, but also whether they start such a stage. For small
firms the addition of the dummy for the start or initi-
ation of any one of the six stages of the R&D process
significantly improves the performance of model 3 over
earlier models (f= 5.014, p< .05). For small firms the
start coefficient is significant and negative (p< .05). This
indicates that announcements of the start of any of the six
stages of theR&Dprocess is of less value to shareholders
than announcement of on-going progress or the results
of any of the six stages. This supports Hypothesis 3a
that states that for small firms announcements of inten-
tion are less valued than announcements of success. For
large firms, the start coefficient is not significant for
models 7 and 8. Thus Hypothesis 3b is supported. For
large firms announcements of intention to start any of
the six micro stages of the R&D process are as valued as
announcements regarding the outcomes of each stage.
4.6. Presence of alliances
As noted above, we did explore whether the presence
of alliances would alter the results. Looking at model 4,
as hypothesized, the coefficient for alliances is negative
for small firms; however this coefficient is not signifi-
cant nor does this model significantly improve upon the
performance of model 3 (f= 0.671). As hypothesized for
large firms the alliance coefficient is positive, however
it is not statistically significant nor does model 8 rep-
resent a significant improvement over the performance
of model 7 (f= 0.844). Thus we find little support for
Hypothesis 4 about the joint value of alliances and R&D
success.
5. Discussion and implications
5.1. Implications for firm-signaling of R&D to
shareholders
We believe that there are three important implica-
tions of our findings at the level of the firm. First, this
study supports the view that investor-shareholders are
not myopic in their analysis of firm value. They value
all (positive) announcements of on-going exploration
and exploitation activities but do not value all six micro
stages equally. Second, stock markets respond differ-
ently to announcements of on-goingR&Dactivities from
small and large firms, with implications for theorizing
about exploration–exploitation and for the strategy of
firms. Third, our results do shed light on potential addi-
tional value in alliances.
It has often been argued that because exploration
returns are more distant there is a danger of underin-
vestment in risky R&D (March, 1991). These concerns
have important consequences for policy debates and
firm strategies. However, Teece (1986) among others
has argued that such dangers can be overcome with
strong institutional property regimes. Recognizing the
issues at stake, institutions and markets have undergone
some profound changes over the last fifteen years. In
the bio-pharmaceutical markets search activities oper-
ate in a strong intellectual property regime. In addition,
FDA and stock market regulation means that on-going
exploration and exploitation activities are monitored by
multiple actors and their value implications analyzed by
the stock market.
Our data confirm that positive news of progress along
all stages of the exploration–exploitation continuum
is recognized and valued. We demonstrate that share-
holders do not appear to be myopic in valuation of
incremental R&D outputs or in the value of exploration.
For the whole sample, the smallest returns reported were
for patents at 2.47% (p< .001). The size and signifi-
cance of this abnormal return is very considerable in
the context of the event study literature in manage-
ment. Narayanan et al. (2000) report considerably lower
abnormal returns of 0.88% (p< .01) for innovation stage
announcements, whilst Kale et al. (2002) report abnor-
mal returns of 0.84% for alliance formation. Returns of
2.47%or greater are rare in the event study literature.Our
results lend support to thework of Coriat andOrsi (2002)
that biotechnology investor-shareholders are aware of
the importance of exploration activities and respond very
positively to positive announcements of on-going R&D
activities being disclosed by management. Furthermore,
results from Table 2 demonstrate that investors do not
value announcements about each of the six micro stages
of the R&D process equally. This suggests that stock
markets are sophisticated in their valuations of R&D
processes. They consider the relative value created by
positive announcements from each of the six stages indi-
vidually. The abnormal returns in response to each of the
six stages are not the same.
Second, we consider the differential response of
shareholders to positive R&D announcements by small
and large firms over the R&D process. For large firms
the local peaks of preclinical trials andNDA indicate that
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shareholders are not drawn towards positive announce-
ments about exploitation activities to the exclusion of
exploration. It is fairly obvious why there is such a
positive outcome forNDAas it reduces regulatory uncer-
tainties about the legal sale of the drug and is highly
valued. The significance of the preclinical trials for large
firms indicates that shareholders are also interested in
their exploration activities.
The lesson for small firms is different. Whilst share-
holders do value positive announcements about all
on-going R&D activities, there is some evidence that
they value early stage exploration activity more highly
than exploitation activities. We believe that this signals
that small firms may have a “comparative advantage”
in exploration research. This finding is in accord with
the comments of Powell (1998) in his discussion of the
evolution of the biotechnology industry. Some caution
should be observed in taking this result too strongly.
DiMasi et al. (1995) argue that both the duration and
costs of preclinical exploration are greater for small than
large pharmaceutical firms (but things may be changing
as small firms become more sophisticated).
Related to the above point, our data suggest that small
firms have to deliver results. We found from Table 5 that
investor-shareholders of small firms appear to be skep-
tical about statements of intention to start any one of
the six micro stages of the R&D process. This may be
because these shareholders lack confidence in the abil-
ity of the small firm to deliver on their intentions. The
message for small firms is perhaps to keep focused and
craft communication strategies that build the confidence
of shareholders in their demonstrated R&D competency
through announcement of the outcomes of their R&D
activities.
Our results have important implications for others that
test the exploration–exploitation hypothesis.Wefind that
small and large firms have different profiles of returns:
in particular small firms seem to have higher exploration
returns than large firms. This would help to explain why
past studies may have yielded mixed results. Varying the
mix of large and small firms in the sample could have
caused differences in past findings.
It is also important to note that our findings may
appear to run against the wisdom expounded by many
industry executives who tend to suggest that small firms
should try to move as fast as possible towards the
exploitation phases as this is where the long-term future
of the industry lies (Brooks, 2003; Edelson and Brown,
2004). These executives talk about firm survival driving
this process. It is true to say from the data that late-stage
exploitation events are valued by the market, but so also
are earlier stages (Fig. 1a and b). The caveat to executive
advice on moving quickly to exploitation is that good
quality exploration activity is worthwhile.
Third, let us consider the role of alliances in share-
holder valuations of R&D success. The non-significance
of alliances as a signal is interesting. There is strong evi-
dence in the literature (reported earlier in this paper)
that alliance formation has a strong positive impact
upon shareholder wealth (Das et al., 1998). We know
that alliance activity represents a considerable source
of funds for R&D activities of biotechnology firms
and that for small firms alliance activity is strongly
associated with new product development (Rothaermel
and Deeds, 2006; Zhang et al., 2007). In addition,
R&D projects achieve higher rates of success at the
later stages of human clinical trials if conducted in
an alliance (Danzon et al., 2005), and thus implicitly
lower R&D costs (DiMasi, 2002). So it may be that
all the shareholder value of an alliance is recognized
by abnormal returns generated at the alliance forma-
tion announcement rather than later when the R&D is
completed.
In evaluating the alliance formation announcement,
shareholders may have counterbalanced these value-
enhancing benefits against the challenge of the ability
of the large partner to capture increasing value over
the life of the alliance. It may be that small firms are
often at danger of long-term value appropriation by
larger partners through unreasonable demands (Alvarez
and Barney, 2001) or through the terms of the original
contract, which may grant the larger partner more favor-
able equity stakes, board control, and reduced upfront
payments (Robinson and Stuart, 2007a,b). Thus, the
future positive and negative value creation and appro-
priation of R&D alliance activity between partners over
the life of the alliance may have been fully captured
at the announcement of the formation of the alliance.
In these circumstances abnormal returns generated by
R&D announcements after the alliance formation would
not reflect the value of the alliance contract, but rather
the underlying R&D activities themselves. Our evidence
in Table 5 appears to support this view. The alliance
dummy variable is therefore not significant in any of our
models.
We do acknowledge several potential limitations of
our study. First, we only study positive announcements
ofR&Dactivity by our sample firms.As indicated earlier
the drugR&Dprocess is risky. Fewdrug compounds suc-
cessfully progress through the process of R&D and onto
the market place. Our sample firms do report negative
findings to the stock market and it may react differently
to these announcements. A practical difficulty that we
faced in including negative announcements in our study
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was the lower frequency with which negative announce-
ments were unambiguously published by the sample
firms. Many negative announcements coincided with
other confounding events, such as announcements of
positive news about other R&D projects. The net effect
of a lower frequency of public announcement of nega-
tive events and a high incidence of confounding events
made the conduct of an event study using negative events
impractical. It should be noted that the problems we
encountered are not confined to the bio-pharmaceutical
sector (Kelm et al., 1995). We recommend that, as the
database of announcements by these firms grows over
time, future studies might seek to undertake an event
study that employs both positive and negative announce-
ments of R&D activities.
Second, it might be argued that our exploration find-
ings are subject to endogeneity in the context of the
broader industry equilibrium of which they are a part.
It could be argued that the small firms in our study
are a self-selected sample of firms with past success
in blue skies biotechnology R&D that are formed with
the purpose of exploitation of their findings. Descriptive
statistics from table four indicate that our small firms are
a little older than our large firms (11.56 years old versus
11 years old). We believe that our sample firms are rep-
resentative of the wider community of entrepreneurial
bio-pharmaceutical firms and thus, whilst recognizing
the possibility of some endogeneity in our study, are not
overly concerned that this has distorted our findings.
5.2. Implications for public policy
What does all this mean for public policy?We believe
that there are three important implications of our work
for research intensive firms. First, the data support the
belief that stock markets monitor and respond to posi-
tive announcements about exploration activities, even of
relatively small entrepreneurial firms. The stock market
appears to be able to monitor and respond differen-
tially to the nuances of the R&D process, as evidenced
by the differential returns that it awards to the six
stages of the R&D process that we focused upon in
the bio-pharmaceuticals industry. A central feature of
these six milestone stages is that each is subject to a
measure of independent external review by actors with
industry-specific knowledge and often access to private
firm knowledge. For example a patent is subject to the
assessment of independent patent assessors; a new drug
marketing approval arises from a process of review of
private firm clinical data by a knowledgeable external
and independent agent in the form of national regula-
tory bodies such as the FDA. As economies become
more knowledge- and research-intensive it is encour-
aging that stock markets have the ability to not only
provide capital to early stage, loss-making firms, but also
that, in the presence of milestones that are subject to
external validation, they are able to assess the long-term
impact of positive announcements of incremental devel-
opments of a firm’s pool of knowledge into its market
valuation.
Second, the market is able to assess the dif-
ferential value created by various stages of the
exploration–exploitation R&D process in large part due
to the existenceof clearmilestoneswithin the exploration
process itself. These milestones facilitate the external
assessment of the value of the exploration activities of
firms, demonstrating the need for highly specialized,
firm-specific private knowledge of the internal activities
of the firm. Where valuation is determined by inter-
nal, firm-specific, private knowledge, stock markets will
be less well placed to value exploration investments
(Tylecote and Ramirez, 2006).
Third, the previous twoconclusions leadus to our cen-
tral research policy implication. Where innovation is of
strategic importance to national and regional economies
andwhere such innovation involves lengthy creation pro-
cesses and substantial capital requirements there is a
need for national bodies and stock markets to consider
the development of structural mechanisms to assist val-
uation of exploration activities through methods other
than earnings statements. The intellectual property rights
regime and regulatory environment that exists in the
bio-pharmaceutical industry may not have as its pri-
mary purpose the creation of investment milestones for
investors, however their existence is a powerful incentive
to investment in this strategically important sector. Stock
markets play an important role in the provision of cap-
ital and incentives to encourage scientist entrepreneurs
to convert their ideas into products with mass market
benefits through the process of commercial exploitation.
Policy makers should consider what other sectors in the
economy that have the features of lengthy development
time horizons, capital intensity and strategic importance
to society they wish to encourage investors to make
financial commitments to. In supporting the sustainabil-
ity of these financial commitments over the lifecycle
of R&D, policy makers should consider what mech-
anisms they can put in place that support innovation
through appropriation regimes that encourage innovation
and put in place milestones that reveal the incremental
value created by such innovation over the R&D lifecy-
cle without requiring revelation of private information
to public shareholders that might destroy intellectual
property rights, be they patents or commercial secrets.
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